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Abstract
Changes in the portfolio and financing behavior of nonfinancial corporations (NFCs) over the post-
1970 period point to the financialization of the nonfinancial corporation and raise the question of accom-
panying changes in fixed investment behavior. Using a firm-level panel, this paper econometrically inves-
tigates the relationship between financialization and investment, exploring the implications of changes
in financing behavior, increasingly entrenched shareholder value norms, and rising firm-level demand
volatility for investment by NFCs in the U.S. between 1971 and 2011. Shareholder value norms and
firm-level volatility are, in particular, identified as characteristics of the post-1970 U.S. economy that are
associated with a significant decline in NFC investment rates. The analysis also highlights key differ-
ences by firm size. In particular, shareholder value norms are found to primarily influence the investment
behavior of large NFCs, while rising volatility most substantially impacts small firms.
⇤Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst, ledavis@econs.umass.edu. I would like to thank Peter
Skott, Gerald Epstein, Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Deepankar Basu, J.W. Mason and Ozgur Orhangazi for their comments on
this paper and its earlier versions.
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1 Introduction
The increasingly dominant role of finance in the U.S. over the post-1970 period has, in recent years, led
to a growing literature on financialization. While the precise concept of financialization varies considerably
across analyses, the shared premise is that financial sector growth signifies an important structural change
in the post-1970 U.S. economy. The growing dominance of finance is highlighted by a sustained increase
in the share of financial-sector profits in total corporate profits over the post-WWII period (Krippner,
2012). With respect to nonfinancial business, financialization is manifested in an increasingly complex
relationship between nonfinancial corporations (NFCs) and the financial sector. Many large NFCs have come
to resemble financial companies and are increasingly engaged in the provision of financial services. The hostile
takeover movement and the emergence of shareholder value ideology point to changes in corporate governance,
arguably increasing the weight of short-term valuations of firm performance in managerial decision-making
(Crotty, 2005; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). Changes in NFC financial behavior are reflected in both an
increasing share of financial assets in firm portfolios, and in changes in the structure of external finance,
including increasing indebtedness and growing equity repurchases among large firms.
This paper explores changes in firm-level fixed investment behavior in the post-1970 U.S. economy,
emphasizing the implications of changes in NFC financing behavior, increasingly entrenched shareholder
value norms, and rising firm-level volatility for fixed investment. Recent work provides empirical support
for the contention that changes associated with a broadly defined phenomenon of financialization inhibit
fixed investment. Stockhammer (2004) finds that rising rentiers’ income explains roughly one third of a
slowdown in capital accumulation in the U.S. (p. 736), and Van Treeck (2008) argues that rising rentier
incomes are responsible for a diversion of funds from physical investment into consumption expenditure. This
literature generally emphasizes the aggregate level, a key exception being Orhangazi (2008), who finds that
increased payments by NFCs to the financial sector and higher financial profits earned by NFCs constrain
fixed investment, particularly among large firms.
While these analyses point to important empirical relationships regarding increased flows between NFCs
and the financial sector, and fixed investment, they also raise further questions. In particular, the use of
financial profits, rentiers’ income or payments to the financial sector as indicators of financialization raises
the question of what changed over the post-1970 period such that these variables rose in a dramatic and
sustained way. Take, for example, Orhangazi’s (2008) finding that increased flows between NFCs and the
financial sector constrain NFC investment rates. These financial flows stem from firm-level decisions to
acquire financial assets, or to borrow, repurchase stocks or pay dividends. On the one hand, an increase in
NFC payments to the financial sector — as an example — draws (by definition) on the pool of available
funds and, therefore, comes at a short-run tradeoff with other uses of funds, including physical investment.
On the other hand, higher leverage — and correspondingly higher interest payments — is the result of a
firm’s decision to borrow in pursuit of some objective: profits, long-run growth, a stock price increase, or to
cover rising interest obligations. The implications for fixed investment are likely to vary with this motivation;
borrowing to acquire fixed capital, for example, differs from borrowing to buyback stock. Thus, the question
arises of why NFC leverage has risen over the post-1970 period or, more broadly, what factors have led to
the observed changes in NFC financial behavior over recent decades?
This paper explores these issues via an econometric investigation of a firm-level investment function. The
empirical specification is based on theories of investment in the spirit of Keynes and Minsky, which impart
a key role to financial factors in investment decisions. Because the decision to invest involves not only a
decision about the proposed investment, but also a decision about how to finance that investment, a firm’s
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financing and investment decisions are interdependent. A large empirical literature based on this body of
theory emphasizes the relevance of financial factors in investment models (Kuh and Meyer, 1957; Fazzari
and Mott, 1986; Fazzari et al, 1988; Ndikumana, 1999; Brown et al, 2009). This theoretical perspective
starkly contrasts a mainstream literature, based in part on the Modigliani-Miller theorem, which disregards
financial factors in describing investment behavior (Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Jorgenson, 1963). This
mainstream approach relies, however, on assumptions of perfect capital markets and perfect information, for
which evidence is weak.
In addition to changes in financial behavior, however, the econometric analysis in this paper incorporates
two factors capturing the changing context within which NFCs make investment and financing decisions
specific to the post-1970 period: increasingly entrenched shareholder value norms, and rising firm-level
volatility. In doing so, this paper makes two contributions to the literature on financialization and fixed
investment. First, the paper identifies shareholder value norms and rising firm-level volatility as factors
associated with a meaningful decline in NFC investment rates over the post-1970 period. Thus, while
changes in investment are linked to financial decisions, changes in investment and financing behavior are also
rooted in new corporate governance norms and rising firm-level volatility. Second, the paper explores firm-
size differences, highlighting that shareholder value norms significantly impact the behavior of large firms,
while investment among smaller firms is more strongly inhibited by rising volatility. This decomposition of
the nonfinancial corporate sector by firm size highlights the power of utilizing firm-level data. The analysis
is also motivated using firm-level descriptive statistics, thereby adding to the existing literature in which
elaboration of the stylized facts has been limited to the sector level.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the stylized facts describing changes in NFC
financial structure from 1971 to 2011. Section 3 motivates the econometric specification, and section 4
presents the empirical specification and data. The econometric results are presented in section 5 and section
6 concludes.
2 The ‘financialization’ of the nonfinancial corporation
2.1 NFC financial decisions: portfolio composition and external finance
Trends in the structure of firm-level balance sheets summarize changes in NFC investment and financing
behavior over the post-1970 period.1 The asset side of the balance sheet highlights, first, a sustained decline
in the share of fixed capital, raising questions about fixed investment in recent decades. The across-firm
yearly median of fixed capital measured relative to sales, shown by the black line in figure 1a, declined 5.3
percentage points between 1971 and 2011, from 24.1 percent in 1971 to 18.8 percent in 2011.2 Concurrently,
financial assets relative to sales rose 18.1 percentage points, from 27.4% in 1971 to 45.5% in 2011. This
portfolio shift towards away from fixed and towards financial assets has been cited in the literature on
financialization to motivate a possible relationship between financialization and fixed investment, raising the
question of whether financial investments are crowding out physical assets.
Growth in NFC financial assets holdings is concentrated, first, in liquid short-term investments and,
second, in ‘miscellaneous’ financial assets. Figure 1b decomposes total financial assets into four (exhaustive)
1The data is from Standard & Poor’s Compustat annual database for 1971 through 2011; details on the variables are in
section 4.2 and also summarized in the appendix.
2The trend is similar if financial assets are instead measured relative to total assets. Sales are used here to proxy for firm
size.
3
Figure 1: Financial assets and capital relative to sales
(a) Financial assets and the capital stock relative to sales (b) Components of financial assets measured relative to sales
Yearly medians
Source: Compustat, author’s calculations
Table 1: Changes in components of financial assets relative to sales for small and large firms; medians
  All firms Small firms* Large firms** 
  1971 2011 pp change 1971 2011 pp change 1971 2011 pp change 
Total financial assets 27.4% 45.5% 18.1 28.5% 51.4% 22.9 29.8% 47.2% 17.4 
     Cash & short-term investments 4.8% 12.4% 7.6 5.5% 20.4% 14.9 4.9% 9.1% 4.2 
     Current receivables 15.3% 13.7% -1.6 16.0% 13.3% -2.7 15.0% 13.6% -1.4 
     Advances 0.6% 0.0% -0.6 0.0% 0.0% 0 3.3% 2.9% -0.4 
     'Other' financial assets 2.3% 7.6% 5.3 2.3% 5.9% 3.6 2.5% 11.1% 8.6 
Capital  24.1% 18.8% -5.3 18.2% 9.7% -8.5 52.4% 43.9% -8.5 !* A firm is categorized as small if its total assets are in the bottom quartile of the asset distribution for any given year.
** A firm is categorized as large if its total assets are in the top quartile of the asset distribution for any given year.
Source: Compustat, author’s calculations
subcategories: total current receivables, cash and short-term investments, investments and advances, and
‘other’ financial assets. The first panel of table 1 summarizes the changes in total financial assets, each
subcategory and capital between 1971 and 2011. While current receivables and advances have both grown
relatively proportionally to firm-level sales, ‘other’ miscellaneous financial assets rise from 2.3 percent of
sales in 1971 to 7.6 percent in 2011.3 The largest increase is, furthermore, in liquid financial assets, which
rise from 4.8 percent of sales in 1971 to 12.4 percent in 2011.4
The portfolio shift away from fixed capital and towards financial assets occurs across firm size. The
second and third panels of table 1 summarize the change in each portfolio component between 1971 and
2011 for small and large firms, where size is defined by total assets. Small firms are defined as firms with
total assets in the bottom quartile of the asset distribution in a given year; large firms have total assets in
3The documentation on what constitutes ‘other’ financial assets is unilluminating. A similar issue arises in the Flow of
Funds data, in which the largest category of financial assets is an unidentified category (see Crotty 2005 for a discussion).
One can, however, draw inferences from the business press, which Krippner (2012) cites in listing “an array of new financial
instruments—money market mutual funds, ‘stripped’ treasuries, Euromarket and Caribbean offshore dollar markets, foreign
currency instruments, and portfolios composed of options and futures contracts” held on NFC balance sheets.
4‘Cash and short-term investments’ includes both cash and securities with original maturities less than one year; because of
accounting rules, ‘cash’ cannot be disaggregated from other ‘short-term investments’.
4
Figure 2: Debt relative to the capital stock
Source: Compustat, author’s calculations
the top quartile of the asset distribution. Among small firms, total financial assets rise from 28.5 percent of
sales in 1971 to 51.4 percent in 2011, while fixed capital declines from 18.2 percent of sales to 9.7 percent.
Similarly, total financial assets held by large firms increase from 29.8 percent of sales in 1971 to 47.2 percent
in 2011, and fixed capital declines from 52.4 percent to 43.9 percent of sales.
Thus, a portfolio shift towards financial assets occurs across the distribution of firms. The composition
of financial assets acquired, however, differs by size. For both small and large firms growth in financial assets
is concentrated in short-term and ‘other’ financial assets, as with the full sample. Among small firms, the
largest increase is in liquid financial assets, which rise from 5.5 percent of sales in 1971 to 20.4 percent in
2011. Concurrently, ‘other’ financial assets rise from 2.3 percent to 5.9 percent of sales. Among large firms,
on the other hand, financial asset acquisitions are far less concentrated in liquid assets. Instead, the greatest
increase lies in ‘other’ financial assets, which rose from 2.5 percent to 11.1 percent of sales from 1971 to 2011.
While the shift in NFC portfolio composition occurs across the distribution of firms, albeit to varying
degrees, changes in the structure of both debt and equity differ decisively by firm size. An increase in gross
corporate debt has been cited as a definitive characteristic of the financialization of nonfinancial corporations
(Palley, 2007), and Flow of Funds data clearly documents rising leverage at the sector-level. At the firm level,
however, rising mean leverage across NFCs is simultaneous with declining median leverage, shown in figure
2. The different trends in mean and median gross indebtedness points to rising leverage among large firms
and concurrent de-leveraging among small firms. Since the early 1970s, the distribution of debt among small
firms has become increasingly skewed towards zero, such that in the last five years of the sample (2005-2009)
more than 55 percent of small firms have leverage between zero and twenty-five percent of capital. Among
large firms, on the other hand, the distribution of debt has shifted to the right, such that there are fewer
large firms with ‘low’ leverage at the end of the period than in the early 1970s.
Rising debt among large firms is accompanied by a dramatic increase in NFC repurchases of own stock.
Stock repurchases have received considerable attention in reference to the shareholder value movement (La-
zonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Lazonick, 2009), and the sector-level trend towards buybacks is well known.
While the firm-level data reinforces this sector-level trend, it also highlights that repurchases are concen-
trated among large firms. Figure 3 plots the across-firm yearly mean of gross equity repurchases relative
to total outstanding equities for the full sample of firms and by firm size. While equity repurchases among
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Figure 3: Equity buybacks
Source: Compustat, author’s calculations
large firms follow the full-sample pattern quite closely, repurchases are low among small firms over the entire
period. Furthermore, the median of equity buybacks in any given year, both for the full sample and each
sub-sample of firms, is zero, reflecting the bulky and episodic nature of repurchase plans: firms announce
that stock will be repurchased over a set number of years, followed by years without repurchases.
Concurrent with these changes in the structure of external finance, the correlation between new borrowing
and investment – shown in figure 4 – has declined, indicating that rising leverage among large firms is not
channeled into physical investment.5 Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) argue, for example, that leveraged
buyouts during the hostile takeover movement, particularly during the 1980s, contribute to the rise in
corporate debt. Borrowing to buyout a company has no direct link to capital investment. The same is true
of repurchasing stock. The concurrent rise in debt and repurchases over this period, therefore, suggests that
equity is being replaced with debt on the balance sheets of large firms, while ‘traditional’ financing behavior
– debt finance for the acquisition of physical assets – is breaking down. As with changes on the asset side
of NFC balance sheets, changes in the structure of external finance, therefore, raise questions about fixed
investment in the post-1970 U.S. economy.
2.2 Changing corporate governance norms: shareholder value ideology
The growing entrenchment of shareholder value norms is one factor that has likely shaped changes in NFC
behavior over the post-1970 period. Institutional changes supporting the emergence of shareholder value
principles began in the 1970s — as inflation increased the value of corporate plant and equipment relative to
low stock prices, supporting the emergence of a corporate takeover market (Krippner, 2012) — and became
increasingly entrenched over the 1980s and 1990s, with the rise of agency theory, institutional investors
and changing norms regarding managerial pay (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). Agency theory suggests
two mechanisms to alleviate agency problems between managers and shareholders (owners) within firms:
a hostile market for corporate control, which ‘disciplines’ managers via a threat to managerial autonomy
(Jensen, 1986, p. 324), and stock option based executive compensation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). The
concurrent rise of institutional investors has supported both a transition away from long-term stock holding
towards higher trading frequency (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Stout, 2012), and the push for stock-option
5A version of this graph appeared in Mason (2013).
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Figure 4: Correlation between investment and borrowing over time
Source: Compustat, author’s calculations
based managerial pay (Krippner, 2012).
These institutional changes have gradually led to the internalization of ‘value maximization’ as a motive
driving managerial decision-making. This shift from traditional objectives – such as growth or profits –
to ‘value maximization’ is summarized by an introductory corporate finance text, which emphasizes the
“fundamental objective of corporate finance: maximizing the current market value of the firm’s outstanding
shares...[The] objective overrides other plausible goals, such as ‘maximizing profits” ’ (Brealey and Meyers,
2012, p. 13). Trends in firm-level balance sheets, furthermore, suggest that this shift in objectives influences
managers’ portfolio and financing decisions. Stock buybacks, in particular, are a clear manifestation of
shareholder value ideology: buybacks improve (stock) market-based valuations of firm performance, reflected
both in a higher share price, and in an increase in return on equity. As such, buybacks both diminish the
likelihood of hostile takeover and increasing the value of stock options.
The imposition of shareholder value norms on managerial decision-making may, however, be primarily
limited to large firms. This distinction is suggested by figure 3, which indicates that equity buybacks over
the post-1970 period are concentrated among large firms. This firm-size difference is also consistent with
evidence that stock option-based pay is greater among large firms, both in absolute values and relative to
firm size, than among small firms (Core et al, 1999).
2.3 Rising firm-level volatility
Rising firm-level volatility over the post-1970 period may have also contributed to the changes in firm-level
financing and investment behavior that point to the financialization of nonfinancial corporations. Rising
firm-level volatility has been extensively documented in the existing literature (Comin and Phillipon, 2005),
and has been linked, for example, to new information and communication technologies leading to shorter
product life cycles (Skott and Guy, 2013). Figure 5 shows volatility for firms in this sample, plotting the
coefficient of variation in the firm-level sales-to-capital ratio, where the standard deviation and mean are
based on five years of lags. Sales volatility for the full sample of firms, shown by the grey line, rises almost
one hundred percent between 1971 and 2011, and volatility among large firms increased approximately fifty
percent, from 11.5 percent in 1971 to 16.9 percent in 2011. Compared to large firms, however, volatility
among small firms increased far more dramatically, nearly doubling from 28.4 percent in 1971 to 53.8 percent
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Figure 5: Volatility (the coefficient of variation in S/K)
in 2011. Figure 5, therefore, suggests that rising volatility provides particular insight into changes in the
behavior of small firms over the recent financialization of the U.S. economy.
For example, higher volatility, reflecting greater uncertainty, is likely to drive increased demand for liquid
assets. Bates et al (2009) find evidence that idiosyncratic risk (firm-level volatility) is a determinant of
increased cash holdings over this period (p. 2018).6 This evidence is consistent with the fact that small
firms hold relatively greater shares of liquid – as opposed to non-liquid – financial assets than large firms (see
table 1). Higher volatility and correspondingly greater uncertainty regarding future demand may similarly
be a factor behind de-leveraging among small firms. Similarly, volatility may affect the decision to invest
in fixed capital. Capital investments are long-term and largely irreversible; in a more volatile environment,
investment demand is likely to be lower for given expected returns.
3 Investment
3.1 Framework
The changes in NFC portfolio composition and external financing behavior suggest accompanying changes in
investment behavior. This section outlines the determinants of investment demand at the firm level, thereby
motivating the econometric specification used below. Consider a firm that invests in two types of assets –
fixed capital (K) and financial capital (M) – and that finances its expenditures via a combination of internal
funds, new debt (D), and proceeds from new equity issues. Using a dot over a variable to denote a time rate
of change, the firm’s uses of funds include the acquisition of new assets, whether fixed capital (K˙ = I) or
financial assets (M˙), dividend payments to shareholders (Div), and interest payments on outstanding debt
(idebtD, where idebt is the firm’s cost of borrowing). The firm’s sources of funds include profits earned on
fixed capital (⇡), returns earned on financial assets (idepM , where idep is the financial profit rate), new share
issues (N˙ new shares at a price of ⌫ per share), and new borrowing (D˙).
The firm’s finance constraint, equating the firm’s total uses and sources of funds, can then be expressed
6An alternative explanation for the build-up of cash among NFCs emphasizes tax motives: because profits earned abroad
would be taxed if repatriated, firms hold foreign profits as cash (Foley et al, 2007). This explanation would apply primarily
to large NFCs, which are more likely to earn foreign income. Bates et al (2009) find, however, that even firms without foreign
income exhibit a secular increase in cash holdings.
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as:
pI + M˙ +Div + idebtD = ⇡ + idepM +  N˙ + D˙ (1)
where p denotes the price of the investment good. Normalizing p to one for simplicity, and writing Div =
(1  sf )(⇧  idebtD) where ⇧ denotes total profits (⇧ = ⇡+ idepM) and sf is the retention rate, the finance
constraint can be rewritten as:
I + M˙ = sf (⇧  idebtD) + ⌫N˙ + D˙ (2)
Equation 2 is an identity, capturing that total assets acquired by a firm – fixed and financial – are equivalent
to the sum of retained earnings and new external finance. This expression highlights the interdependence
of investment and financing decisions: decisions to invest in fixed capital or to acquire financial assets are
concurrent with decisions about how to finance that asset acquisition.
For a given set of objectives, the firm’s desired stocks of capital, financial assets and debt (K⇤, M⇤, and
D⇤) can be defined as the levels the firm would select if it could adjust each stock freely in pursuit of these
objectives, subject to labor market, demand and financing constraints.7 Financing constraints include both
the macroeconomic interest rate environment, and also how the interest rate faced by an individual firm
depends on factors such as current leverage and wealth. A large firm with greater accumulated wealth, for
example, has a larger desired stock of capital or debt, at otherwise equal expected rates of return, than a
firm with less accumulated wealth. Due to imperfect competition in goods markets and imperfections in
financial markets – requiring, for example, collateral to obtain external financing – the desired stocks are
finite.
The desired stocks of capital, financial assets, and debt can be summarized as jointly determined by the
expected profit rate on fixed capital, the financial profit rate and the cost of borrowing. A higher expected
profit rate on fixed capital (⇡e) makes holding capital more desirable (K⇤⇡e > 0). Consistent with a Keynesian
perspective, the specification emphasizes that future profits are unknown, such that investment depends on
the expected profit rate on new capital. Similarly, all else equal, a higher financial profit rate (idep) makes
holding financial assets more desirable (M⇤idep > 0), and a higher cost of borrowing (i
debt) leads to a smaller
desired stock of debt (D⇤idebt < 0).
The adjustment of the firm’s capital stock can then be described by a stock adjustment from the current
level of each stock towards the desired level. Because K, M and D are jointly determined, the evolution
of capital depends not only on the discrepancy between the current and desired level of capital, but also
on the simultaneous discrepancy between the current and desired levels of financial assets and debt. The
adjustment of the firm’s capital stock over time (K˙) can, therefore, be summarized as:8
K˙ = f(K⇤  K,M⇤  M,D⇤  D)
such that the firm’s investment rate can be written:
Kˆ =
K˙
K
=
I
K
= f(
K⇤  K
K
,
M⇤  M
K
,
D⇤  D
K
) (3)
= f(
K⇤
K
,
K⇤
K
M⇤
K⇤
,
M
K
,
K⇤
K
D⇤
K⇤
,
D
K
) (4)
7Of course, firms do not directly maximize objective functions; however, strict maximization is not necessary. The key point
is that, at any point in time, firms have desired stocks of capital, financial assets and debt, which are determined in pursuit of
the firm’s objectives, and which are jointly determined due to the finance constraint.
8After including capital, financial assets and debt, the book value of equity is simply a residual; the adjustment of the stock
of equity is, therefore, not included separately here.
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As discussed above, the desired levels of each stock (expressed in equation 4 as K
⇤
K ,
M⇤
K⇤ and
D⇤
K⇤ ) are jointly
determined by the expected profit rate, the financial profit rate and the cost of borrowing.9 Assuming that
individual NFCs do not have price-setting power in financial markets, both the financial profit rate and the
cost of borrowing are exogenous determinants of investment. With imperfect competition in product markets,
however, expected profitability is not an exogenous parameter; expected profitability is, instead, summarized
by the combination of current profits (⇡) and the utilization rate of fixed capital (u), which together capture
the demand and production conditions facing the firm (Skott, 1989). Because expectations regarding future
profits are formed largely on the basis of recent performance, current profitability is an indicator of expected
future profitability. However, un-utilized capital does not earn profits; thus, the expected return on additional
capital also depends on whether the additional unit of capital will be utilized. If the firm’s utilization rate
is below its desired level, the expected profit rate on additional capital is correspondingly low. Equation 5,
therefore, summarizes the determinants of investment demand:
I/K = f˜(⇡, u, idep, idebt,
M
K
,
D
K
) (5)
The expected signs follow from the discussion above. A higher expected profit rate increases the desired
stock of capital, thereby stimulating investment, the profit rate and the utilization rate are positively related
to the investment rate. Utilization also captures an accelerator effect: an increase in demand, reflected in
increased utilization, induces a firm invest so as to re-build its desired level of excess capacity. The financial
profit rate, on the other hand, is negatively associated with the investment rate. The financial profit rate
captures the opportunity cost of acquiring fixed rather than financial assets and, therefore, the ‘hurdle’ rate
of return that a manager must expect to earn on fixed capital in order to invest in fixed rather than financial
assets. This logic is consistent with Tobin’s (1965) discussion of portfolio decisions in a monetary economy.
Similarly, a higher cost of borrowing is associated with a lower investment rate. Because capital investments
are generally financed with a combination of internal and external funds, an increase in the cost of external
funds decreases investment demand at otherwise equal expected rates of return.
The stock of financial assets is positively related to the investment rate. Financial assets have charac-
teristics that support investment; in particular, financial assets, unlike debt, are under the sole discretion
of managers and entail no future cash payment commitments. If the firm’s outstanding stock of financial
assets exceeds the desired stock of financial assets, resources will be reallocated into capital investments, and
investment will rise. The relationship between financial assets and capital, therefore, captures a portfolio
readjustment process whereby, at given rates of return on fixed and financial assets, a firm holds both fi-
nancial assets and fixed capital in a relatively stable proportion. This point is, again, consistent with Tobin
(1965), who argues that in a monetary economy with two types of assets, “the community will hold the
two assets in proportions that depend on their respective yields” (Tobin, 1965, p. 678), such that “Capital
deepening in production requires monetary deepening in portfolios” (p. 679).
Last, the stock of debt is, all else equal, negatively associated with the investment rate. Contrary to
financial assets, debt entails future cash payment commitments. A larger stock of debt increases both
lenders’ and borrowers’ risk, reducing the firm’s investment demand (Keynes, 1936; Minsky, 1975). From
the perspective of management, a larger stock of debt reduces the firm’s margin of safety with which to
9The stock adjustment in equation 3 similarly describes the adjustment of stocks of financial assets and debt (M˙ and D˙):
M˙ = h(K⇤  K,M⇤  M,D⇤  D)
D˙ = z(K⇤  K,M⇤  M,D⇤  D)
These three adjustment processes must be jointly satisfied.
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respond to adverse shocks (Kalecki, 1971), thereby decreasing managerial willingness to tie up funds in
capital investments.10 From the perspective of creditors, a large stock of debt signals potential solvency
problems and intensifies agency problems in the lending relationship. Thus, a large stock of debt may inhibit
a firm’s ability to obtain (additional) external funds, constraining future investment.
3.2 Shareholder value norms
Because the firm’s objectives define the desired stocks of capital, financial assets and debt (K⇤, M⇤, and
D⇤), the specific functional form of investment demand depends on these objectives as well. As of yet,
these objectives have not been specified. As discussed in section 2, however, the increasing entrenchment
of shareholder value norms over recent decades has led to the internalization of ‘value maximizing’ norms
and, accordingly, a shift in objectives towards a growing emphasis on ‘value’. It has, furthermore, been a
frequent claim in the literature that this growing emphasis on shareholder value has shortened managerial
time horizons, such that managers targeting value are less likely to tie up funds in long-term, irreversible
capital investments than managers targeting ‘traditional’ objectives, all else equal.
The implication is that growing emphasis on ‘value maximizing’ objectives has a direct negative effect
on NFC investment rates, which can be captured via a shift in the investment demand function:
I/K = f˜(u,⇡, idep, idebt,K,M,D;Sv) (6)
where Sv denotes shareholder value objectives and (I/K)Sv < 0. Equation 6 states that at an otherwise
equal financial profit rate, expected profit rate, utilization rate, cost of borrowing, and stocks of capital,
financial assets and debt, a manager aiming to maximize a firm’s stock market valuation will allocate fewer
funds towards long-term capital investment projects than a manager targeting traditional objectives.
Stockhammer (2004) also argues that shareholder value ideology constrains investment via changing man-
agerial preferences. Empirically, Stockhammer equates shareholder value objectives with rentiers’ income,
a variable that is similar to financial profits. Because rentiers’ income is endogenous to the investment
decision, however, it is also interrelated with the firm’s other financial decisions, such as the use of debt
and equity. Equating shareholder value objectives with rentiers’ income, therefore, omits changes in a firm’s
response to a given cost of borrowing or financial profitability that may accompany an increased emphasis
on shareholder value. Here, the implications of shareholder value norms are, instead, explored via a shift in
the finance constraint to allow for possible impacts of shareholder value norms on other financial decisions,
in addition to investment. Specifically, the implications of shareholder value objectives are explored via the
impact of shareholder value norms on investment, where the growing entrenchment of these norms can be
understood as exogenous to the individual firm.
3.3 Firm-level volatility
On the other hand, for given objectives, a firm’s desired stocks of capital, financial assets and debt also
depend on its environment. Rising volatility over the post-1970 period signals, however, changes in the
environment within which NFCs make investment and financing decisions. Because higher volatility reflects
10The ‘appropriate’ or safe level of leverage may vary with the business cycle: during an upswing, for example, the level of
leverage that both managers and creditors find appropriate may rise (Minsky, 1975). This endogenous change in the safe level
of leverage would diminish the negative impact of debt on investment during an upswing, and increase the strength of the effect
during a downswing.
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greater uncertainty, a manager facing high volatility is expected to invest less in fixed capital, all else equal,
than a manager facing low volatility. As with shareholder value norms, the impact of firm-level volatility
on the investment decision can be expressed via a shift in the investment demand function, capturing that
managers react differently to the same financial variables in a highly volatile or a less volatile environment.
Incorporating volatility (V ), equation 7 presents the final investment specification:
I/K = f˜(u,⇡, idep, idebt,K,M,D;Sv, V ) (7)
In addition to shareholder value norms and volatility, other factors – in particular, changes in the com-
petitive environment stemming from increased international competition and the globalization of production
– are also likely to influence NFC investment behavior over the post-1970 period.11 Rather than proposing
an exahustive explanation of factors causing changes in investment behavior, however, this paper focuses
more narrowly on the implications of two particular channels for domestic investment. The exclusion of
other potentially relevant factors is, however, a limitation of this paper.
4 Empirical strategy and data
4.1 Statistical specification
The empirical specification of the investment function follows from the discussion in section 3:
(I/K)it =  0+ 1(I/K)i,t 1+ 2ui,t 1+ 3⇡i,t 1+ 4idepi,t 1+ 5i
debt
i,t 1+ 6(
M
A
)i,t 1+ 7(
D
A
)i,t 1+ 8Rk,t 1+ 9Vi,t 1+"it
(8)
where A denotes total assets, the subscript i denotes the firm, t denotes the year, and k denotes industry.
In addition to the terms discussed above, the empirical specification includes a lagged dependent variable
to incorporate dynamic effects in the adjustment of the capital stock. These dynamic effects capture per-
sistence and path dependencies in investment stemming from the long-term nature of capital investments,
irreversibilities in investments, and adjustment costs in the acquisition and implementation of new capital.
Thus, the coefficient is expected to be positive ( 1 > 0). Kopcke and Brauman (2001) and Eberly et al
(2012) demonstrate the significance of a lagged dependent variable in explaining investment behavior.
The remaining expected signs follow from section 3. The coefficient on capacity utilization (u) is expected
to be positive ( 2 > 0) and, controlling for capacity utilization, the coefficient on the profit rate is also
expected to be positive ( 3 > 0). Both the financial profit rate and the cost of borrowing are expected to be
negatively related to fixed investment ( 4 < 0 and  5 < 0). Finally, the coefficient on the stock of financial
assets is expected to be positive ( 6 > 0), while the coefficient on the firm’s outstanding stock of debt is
expected to be negative ( 7 < 0).
4.1.1 Shareholder value norms
In the empirical specification, shareholder value norms are captured by the yearly industry-level average
of gross stock repurchases relative to total equity (Rkt). The variable is included to explore the impact
on investment of the expectations of (stock) market participants that managers target stock market-based
indicators of firm performance over profit or growth objectives. Because the objective is to explore the
11The development of global value chains and the offshoring of production, such that capital is moved abroad but sales
are recorded in domestic income accounts, are additional factors behind the declining capital to sales ratio (see, for example,
Milberg, 2008).
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implications of changing corporate governance norms on investment, the repurchases variable does not explore
the direct effect of an individual firm’s decision to repurchase stock on its own investment. The independent
inclusion of firm-level repurchases would, however, provide little econometrically relevant information about
investment due to the bulky and episodic nature of stock repurchase plans.
The expectation is that norms encouraging managerial ‘maximization’ of market-based value impinge on
the allocation of resources for fixed investment ( 8 < 0). In particular, managers operating in industries in
which average repurchases rise face pressure to target financial indicators of firm performance, because the
firms in each industry constitute a comparison group against which managerial performance is evaluated. As
a manager in industry k, higher average industry-level repurchases indicate that other managers in industry
k are repurchasing stock, thereby, both improving financial metrics of performance such as earnings per
share and return on equity, and increasing the value of their own stock options. Consequently, as a manager
in this industry, you also face pressure to target these financial indicators. Not doing so, first, makes your
firm appear undervalued on the stock market relative to competitors, thus making your firm a candidate
for corporate takeover and risking your position of authority as a manager. Second, the value of the stock
options of other managers in your peer group rise relative to your own. The resulting pressure to reallocate
funds towards financial performance squeezes fixed investment.
As suggested by the discussion in section 2, however, shareholder value norms are expected to primarily
influence the behavior of large corporations. These large corporations also drive the sector-level trends.
Thus, the relationship between the repurchases variable and the investment rate is expected to be negative
for large firms and for the full sample; however, the effect is expected to be stronger for large firms. With
less evidence that shareholder value norms impact the behavior of smaller firms, the coefficient is expected
to be insignificant for subsamples of small firms.
4.1.2 Volatility
Similarly, managers of firms facing high volatility are expected to be less willing to tie up funds in long-term
fixed investment projects, and more apt to acquire financial assets. Thus, an increase in firm-level volatility
is expected to have a negative effect on fixed investment ( 9 < 0). Like shareholder value norms, volatility
is expected to have differential effects on investment; however, unlike shareholder value norms, volatility is
expected to most strongly impact the investment rates of small firms.
4.2 Estimation strategy
The empirical specification also includes time- and firm-level fixed effects. These fixed effects capture un-
observable year- and firm-specific factors that are relevant for describing a firm’s behavior but cannot be
explicitly controlled for in the regression — in the case of firm fixed effects, for example, managerial capa-
bility. The estimations use the Arellano-Bond Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), which accounts for
potential endogeneity arising from the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable and firm-level fixed effects
in a panel setting.
The estimations also include additional lags of the explanatory variables. The inclusion of lags is standard
in empirical work on investment functions (Fazzari et al, 1988; Fazzari and Mott, 1986; Ndikumana, 1999).
Because managers act subject to uncertainty and imperfect information, investment decisions are based on
expectations regarding the future. These expectations, formed on the basis of recent experience, are captured
empirically by lags of the explanatory variables. Results are reported for three lags of the explanatory
13
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
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variables. Estimations with two lags are similar but show evidence of second order autocorrelation in the
errors, which is ameliorated by the inclusion of the third lag. Because volatility is constructed on the basis
of a five-year moving average and, therefore, incorporates multiple years of information, only the first lag of
volatility is included.
It is, finally, important to note inherent difficulties in empirical analyses of investment functions. The
interdependence of portfolio and financing decisions introduces potential endogeneity between the financing
variables and the investment decision. In this paper, two steps are taken to ameliorate the potential for bias.
First, the estimates are based on lagged rather than contemporaneous values of the explanatory variables.
Fazzari and Mott (1986) use a similar procedure: “Because all investment must be financed somehow, either
internally or externally, current investment is closely linked to current finance by definition. Omitting the
contemporaneous finance variables from the regression and using only lagged values alleviates this problem”
(p. 179).12 The investment rate is, similarly, defined as a function of lagged explanatory variables in
Orhangazi (2008) and Stockhammer (2004). Second, the Arellano-Bond methodology, which corrects for
endogeneity introduced by the lagged dependent variable by instrumenting I/Kt 1 with its own lags, is
extended to the other potentially endogenous variables. Thus, the variables appearing in the firm’s finance
constraint (⇡, idep, idebt, M , D) are also instrumented with their own lags using GMM.
4.3 Data
The sample is an unbalanced panel of annual data for publicly traded nonfinancial U.S. firms from Standard
& Poor’s Compustat databse between 1971 and 2011.13 Table 2 summarizes descriptive statistics for the full
sample and by size quartiles. Size is again defined by total assets. The variable definitions are as follows.
The investment rate is capital expenditures relative to the capital stock. This investment rate refers to
domestic investment. Capacity utilization is defined as sales relative to the capital stock. This definition
of capacity utilization is standard in empirical studies using firm-level data because there is no analog for
capacity at the firm level (Fazzari and Mott, 1986; Orhangazi, 2008). The profit rate on fixed capital is
defined as profits (gross operating income) relative to the capital stock. Analogously, the financial profit
rate is financial profits (non-operating income) relative to the outstanding stock of financial assets. Financial
assets are the sum of cash and short-term investments, current receivables, ‘other’ investments, and advances.
The cost of borrowing is the firm’s effective interest burden: interest payments relative to total debt. This
variable captures factors contributing to a firm’s cost of obtaining external finance, such as the firm’s bond
or credit rating, banking relationships and outstanding lines of credit. The financial profit rate and effective
interest burden are adjusted for inflation using the GNP deflator. Shareholder value norms are captured by
the yearly industry average of gross stock repurchases relative to total outstanding equity. Finally, volatility
is the coefficient of variation in firm-level sales-to-capital ratio, where the mean and standard deviation are
averaged over the previous five years of data. The ratios are winsorized. These variable definitions, with the
Compustat reference numbers, are also summarized in the appendix.
A final data issue concerns adjustment of the measured rates of return for taxes. The rates of return here
are pre-tax rates of return and are, therefore, imperfect measures of the profit rates facing firms in the U.S.
12Additional justification for this choice stems from the fact that, for example, profits earned in period t are still unrealized
when investment decisions in period t are made, whereas profits from period t   1 are already realized and, therefore, a
determinant of the decision to invest.
13The unbalanced panel is preferable to a balanced panel for two reasons. First, because Compustat’s coverage increases
over time, balancing the panel would substantially truncate the information used in the estimations. Because a balanced panel
is unnecessary econometrically, dropping this available information is undesirable. Second, by only including firms that have
survived for the full period, a balanced panel would introduce biases favoring large and well-established firms.
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economy. This is a limitation of the available data. While a firm’s average tax rate can be calculated, it is
not possible to determine whether those taxes are applied to financial or nonfinancial income. The extent to
which firms are differentially able to avoid taxation further discredits attempts to incorporate a firm’s tax
burden into the measured profit rates (tax havens, for example, are likely to be more heavily utilized by large
multinational corporations). A direct treatment of taxes is similarly avoided in other firm-level investment
studies.
5 Results
Table 3 presents the primary regression results for the full sample and for size quartiles. Long-run multipliers,
summarizing the total effect of the three lags of each explanatory variable on investment, are shown in table
4.14
5.1 Non-financial determinants of investment
Together, the non-financial determinants of investment — the lagged dependent variable, capacity utilization
and the profit rate — point to the validity of the regression model. For the full sample of firms, the coefficient
on the first lag of the dependent variable is positive and significant, capturing dynamic effects in investment
behavior. With the exception of the smallest quartile of firms, this coefficient is also positive for all size
sub-samples, and the magnitude of the effect becomes stronger as firm size increases.
The coefficients on capacity utilization and profitability also have the expected signs in most specifica-
tions. Coefficients on both the first lag and the long-run multipliers for capacity utilization are positive
and significant for the full sample of firms and the first three size quartiles; for the largest quartile of firms
the coefficient is negative, but insignificant. The magnitude of the short-run relationship between capacity
utilization and investment, captured by the coefficient on the first lag of S/K, is large: in the full sample,
a one standard deviation increase in capacity utilization implies a 0.29 standard deviation increase in the
investment rate. The short run coefficient on the profit rate also has the expected sign in the largest three
quartiles, and the estimate is significant for sub-samples of above-median firm size. The long run coefficients
have the expected sign in all but the smallest sample of firms, but are insignificant. An insignificant coeffi-
cient on the profit rate is, however, unsurprising given that other explanatory variables capture trends that
are empirically similar to profits and, in particular, capacity utilization may absorb the effect of the profit
rate.
5.2 Financial determinants of investment
The results highlight the importance of changes in NFC financial behavior since the early 1970s for fixed
investment. Beginning with the financial profit rate, the coefficients on both the first lag and the long-
run multiplier for the full sample of firms are negative as expected, although not statistically significant.
Furthermore, with respect to the financial profit rate the firm size results are particularly interesting. While
the short run coefficients on the first lag of the financial profit rate for the smaller three quartiles of firms are
14The appendix also includes additional specifications. The long-run multipliers are calculated as follows. Consider, for
example, a basic investment function, in which investment is a function of three lags of both investment and profits: (I/K)t =P3
i=1
↵i(I/K)t i +
P3
i=1
 i⇡t 1. The long-run multiplier for profits (LR⇡) captures the cumulative effect of a change in
profits on investment: LR⇡ = (
P3
i=1
 i)/(1 
P3
i=1
↵i).
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Table 3: Estimation results; dependent variable I/K
  All NFCs 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile  3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 
(I/K)t-1 0.2600*** 0.0435* 0.1519*** 0.2991*** 0.4127*** 
  (0.0118) (0.0232) (0.0200) (0.0189) (0.0202) 
(I/K)t=2 0.0165* -0.0654*** -0.0231* 0.0007 0.0040 
  (0.0083) (0.0156) (0.0128) (0.0119) (0.0121) 
(I/K)t-3 0.0032 -0.0381*** -0.0265*** -0.0056 -0.0078 
  (0.0068) (0.0132) (0.0101) (0.0100) (0.0090) 
(S/K)t-1 0.0035*** 0.0030*** 0.0043*** 0.0031*** -0.0001 
  (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0011) 
(S/K)t-2 -0.0007*** -0.0001 -0.0006* 0.0003 -0.0005 
  (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0011) 
(S/K)t-3 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0005 0.0003 
  (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
πt-1 -0.0007 -0.0016 0.0005 0.0067*** 0.0094** 
  (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0046) 
πt-2 0.0000 -0.0014 0.0009 -0.0040* 0.0003 
  (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0022) 
πt-3 0.0011 0.0009 0.0009 0.0004 -0.0006 
  (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
idept-1 -0.1222* -0.0422 -0.0535 -0.1110 0.0227 
  (0.0670) (0.0715) (0.0894) (0.0705) (0.0371) 
idept-2 0.0884 -0.0045 -0.0328 -0.0029 0.0554* 
  (0.0591) (0.0749) (0.0799) (0.0524) (0.0316) 
idept-3 -0.0157 -0.0417 0.1017** -0.0335 -0.0224 
  (0.0284) (0.0414) (0.0442) (0.0337) (0.0201) 
idebtt-1 -0.0468 -0.0069 -0.0208 -0.0093 -0.0460 
  (0.0295) (0.0287) (0.0269) (0.0250) (0.0284) 
idebtt-2 0.0301 0.0099 0.0015 0.0033 0.0009 
  (0.0319) (0.0323) (0.0272) (0.0245) (0.0228) 
idebtt-3 0.0099 0.0138 0.0124 0.0039 0.0227** 
  (0.0094) (0.0124) (0.0116) (0.0113) (0.0116) 
(M/A)t-1 0.1549*** 0.1689*** 0.1620*** 0.1417** 0.1082** 
  (0.0552) (0.0601) (0.06222) (0.0588) (0.0472) 
(M/A)t-2 0.1036* 0.1607*** -0.0087 0.0878* 0.1105*** 
  (0.0560) (0.0583) (0.0641) (0.0514) (0.0417) 
(M/A)t-3 -0.1002*** -0.0326 -0.0657 -0.0533 -0.0895*** 
  (0.0360) (0.0448) (0.0431) (0.0375) (0.0322) 
(D/A)t-1 -0.1024*** -0.0670** -0.05661 -0.1513*** -0.1640*** 
  (0.0314) (0.0284 (0.0404) (0.0405) (0.0422) 
(D/A)t-2 0.0680** 0.0483* -0.0629 0.0515 0.0124 
  (0.0334) (0.0278) (0.0408) (0.0384) (0.0385) 
(D/A)t-3 -0.0234 -0.0130 -0.0101 -0.0038 0.0369 
  (0.0236) (0.0234) (0.0284) (0.0268) (0.0265) 
Rt-1 -0.3366** -1.0764* 0.2419 -0.1991 -0.4463*** 
  (0.1551) (0.6253) (0.3826) (0.2140) (0.1621) 
Rt-2 -0.2130 -0.7491 -06556* 0.1486 -0.1891 
  (0.1469) (0.6308) (0.3733) (0.2036) (0.1408) 
Rt-3 -0.1862 -1.2875 0.1784 0.0321 -0.4648** 
  (0.1792) (0.7978) (0.4555) (0.2363) (0.1840) 
Vt-1 -0.0990*** -0.0895*** -0.0859*** -0.0726*** -0.0653*** 
  (0.0094) (0.0168) (0.1434) (0.0158) (0.0165) 
Obs 99,096 13,624 21,830 28,397 35,245 
Firms 10,316 2,835 4,153 4,177 3,006 
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan (p value) 0.0000 0.5706 0.0003 0.0321 0.0000 
2nd order auto. 0.4691 0.5347 0.9105 0.5287 0.7697 !The regressions are based on the Arellano-Bond Generalized Method of Moments. The instrument set includes includes instruments
beginning from t  2, and is restricted to three additional lags of the explanatory variables to keep the number of instruments less than
the number of groups. Coefficients for the year fixed effects are not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The p values
for the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions and for the Arellano-Bond test of second order autocorrelation are obtained
from two-step estimations.
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%.
Each firm-size quartile is defined according to total assets (the first quartile includes firms with total assets below the 25th percentile
of total assets for that year, the second quartile includes firms with total assets above the 25th percentile and below the 50th percentile
of total assets for that year, etc.).
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Table 4: Long-run coefficients; dependent variable I/K
  All NFCs 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile  3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 
(S/K) 0.0038*** 0.0029*** 0.0041*** 0.0040*** -0.0005 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0020) 
π 0.0005 -0.0020 0.0026 0.0044 0.0153 
  (0.0026) (0.0018) (0.0034) (0.6248) (0.0096) 
idep -0.0687 -0.0834 0.0172 -0.2088* 0.0943** 
  (0.0730) (0.0963) (0.1368) (0.1144) (0.0408) 
idebt -0.0009 0.0158 -0.0077 -0.0028 -0.0378 
  (0.0568) (0.0426) (0.0439) (0.0415) (0.0519) 
(M/A) 0.2197*** 0.2802*** 0.0975 0.2496*** 0.2186*** 
  (0.0503) (0.0655) (0.0162) (0.0679) (0.0519) 
(D/A) -0.0802*** -0.0300 -0.1444*** -0.1469*** -0.1940*** 
  (0.0283) (0.0279) (0.0461) (0.0388) (0.0401) 
R -1.0215** -2.9371** -0.2622 -0.0261 -1.8613** 
  (0.4398) (1.1785) (0.8218) (0.6248) (0.5762) 
V -0.0990*** -0.0895*** -0.0859*** -0.0726*** -0.0653*** 
  (0.0094) (0.0168) (0.1434) (0.0158) (0.0165) !The long-run coefficients are based on the regression results in table 3. Results for volatility are based replicated from table 3 for
comparison. Long-run coefficients are calculated on the basis of an autoregressive process: the sum of the coefficients on the lags of
each variable, divided by one minus the sum of the coefficients on the lags of investment. The p-values are based on a Chi2 statistic.
The standard errors, shown in parentheses, are calculated by dividing the estimate by square root of the Chi2 statistic.
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%.
negative as expected, the coefficients on both the first lag and the long-run multiplier for the largest quartile
of firms are positive and – in the case of the long-run effect – statistically significant.
The positive relationship between the financial profit rate and investment among large firms suggests
that large firms generate complementarities between financial profits and the non-financial components of
their business that are not captured by smaller firms. As noted in section 2, large firms have also acquired
relatively more non-liquid (‘other’) financial assets than smaller firms. Together, the different composition
of financial assets by firm size and the positive coefficient on the financial profit rate for large firms suggest
different motivations for acquiring financial assets for firms of different sizes. While the liquid assets acquired
by small firms may hedge against volatility and risk, the ‘other’ financial assets held by large NFCs may
instead reflect movement into the provision of financial services, namely borrowing and lending for profit.
NFC expansion into car loans and store-issued credit cards are particularly cogent examples (Froud et al,
2005). Store-issued credit cards, for example, generate financial profits and also capture demand for the
firm’s non-financial products, thereby supporting fixed investment.
The coefficient on the first lag of the effective interest burden is negative in all specifications, but sta-
tistically insignificant. Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect is quite small. For the full sample, a one
standard deviation increase in the effective interest rate corresponds to a 0.05 standard deviation decline
in the investment rate. The long-run multiplier is also insignificant in all specifications, suggesting that a
higher cost of borrowing has no significant long-run effect on investment. Notably, Orhangazi (2008) finds
a negative, but in most subsamples significant, relationship between the first lag of NFC payments to the
financial sector and fixed investment. However, Orhangazi’s payments variable combines interest payments
with shareholders payouts (dividend payments and stock buybacks). Importantly, the difference between
Orhangazi’s results and those presented here suggests that the strength of Orhangazi’s finding captures
payouts to shareholders, rather than to creditors.
The stock of financial assets is found to have a positive and robust relationship to fixed investment in both
the short-term and the long-run in most specifications. This result does not lend support to the proposition
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in the financialization literature that financial assets are crowding out physical investment. Instead, the stock
of financial assets is the only avenue through which post-1970 changes in NFC financial structure are found
to support investment. In the full sample, a one standard deviation increase in the stock of financial assets
is associated with a 0.18 standard deviation increase in the investment rate. This positive relationship is
consistent with the portfolio adjustment process described in section 3: for given expected returns, firms hold
both fixed and financial assets, and investment increases if the stock of financial assets rises above the desired
level.15 Thus, firms acquire financial assets – which ameliorate inherent risks of long-term and irreversible
capital investments – concurrently with fixed capital. The magnitude of the coefficient is smaller for large
firms, particularly in the short run, which is consistent with the idea that large firms face fewer constraints
than small firms in obtaining external finance and, therefore, depend less strongly on the smoothing function
of financial assets.
The stock of financial assets has not been included in the empirical literature on financialization and
investment, and the independent inclusion of the stock of financial assets and the financial profit rate is an
innovation of this paper. While the stock of financial assets is found to have a robust positive relationship
to fixed investment, the financial profit rate is negatively related to investment in most specifications. The
difference points to different time implications of the financial profit rate and an acquired stock of financial
assets. An increase in the financial profit rate may drive a short-term reallocation of funds towards financial
assets, but a larger stock of financial assets provides flexibility to carry out long-term fixed investment
projects despite uncertainty regarding profits and the cost and availability of external finance.
Last, for the full sample and all size sub-samples, an increase in the stock of debt is found to constrain
investment. In both the short run and the long run, the stock of debt is found to have a negative and
significant relationship to fixed investment in most specifications, and particularly among large firms. In the
full sample, a one standard deviation increase in the stock of debt is associated with a 0.16 standard deviation
decline in investment. This finding is consistent with the existing literature, which also highlights a robust
negative relationship between a firm’s stock of debt and investment rate (Ndikumana, 1999; Orhangazi, 2008).
Thus, among large firms, whose stocks of debt rose substantially after the 1970s, this negative relationship
points to a marked decline in the support of external finance for fixed investment in recent decades.
5.3 Shareholder value norms
The results, furthermore, capture a negative relationship between shareholder value norms and fixed invest-
ment rates. Both the first lag and the long-run multiplier of the repurchases variable are found to have
a significant negative relationship to NFC investment rates for the full sample of firms, implying that an
increase in average industry-level repurchases leads to a decrease in investment rates among other firms in
that industry. Thus, managers in industries in which average repurchases rise also face pressure to target
financial performance indicators. The pressure to reallocate funds towards financial targets squeezes fixed
investment. This finding is consistent with the financialization literature emphasizing changes in corporate
governance associated with shareholder value ideology (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000), and the findings
here draw a direct link between shareholder value norms and investment behavior. These conclusions are
consistent with Stockhammer (2004), but provide explicit firm-level, rather than aggregate-level, empirical
support for a negative relationship between shareholder value ideology and fixed investment.
15Empirically, the stock of financial assets may also capture a ‘financing motive’ , summarizing profitability and demand from
previous periods as firms saved up to invest. The empirical results are, however, robust to omitting financial assets from the
regression; these results are shown in the appendix.
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The empirical results also reiterate the expected firm-size differences: shareholder value norms are found
to most strongly impact the investment behavior of the largest quartile of firms. While average industry-
level repurchases are also found to be significant for the full sample and weakly significant for the smallest
quartile of firms, the magnitude of the effect among the largest firms is considerably greater than for either
the full sample or small firms.16 A one standard deviation increase in average industry-level repurchases
is associated with only a 0.02 standard deviation decline in investment for the full sample of firms, and
a 0.05 standard deviation decline in investment for the smallest firms. For the largest quartile of firms,
however, a one standard deviation increase in average industry-level repurchases is associated with a 0.14
standard deviation decline in investment. This comparison highlights both that these largest firms drive the
sector-level behavior, and that the impingement of shareholder value norms on fixed investment is largely a
phenomenon of large corporations.
5.4 Firm-level volatility
The results also highlight the importance of rising volatility in driving changes in the investment behavior of
small firms. Rising firm-level volatility is found to have a negative and significant impact on fixed investment
rates for both the full sample and each subsample of firms, supporting the claim that rising firm-level volatility
over the post-1970 period has contributed to a decline in investment rates. For the full sample, a one standard
deviation increase in volatility is associated with a 0.13 standard deviation decline in the investment rate.
The magnitude of the effect is, furthermore, greater for the smallest quartile of firms: among small firms,
a one standard deviation increase in volatility is associated with a 0.17 standard deviation decline in the
investment rate. Among the largest quartile of firms, on the other hand, a one standard deviation increase
in volatility is associated with only a 0.04 standard deviation decline in the investment rate. This finding
highlights that small firms are more sensitive to a given increase in volatility than larger firms, which is
logical given that small firms – with fewer total assets and market power – are more vulnerable to swings in
sales than large firms. Because the total rise in volatility is also especially dramatic among smaller firms, the
cumulative effect of rising volatility is particularly important in explaining the investment behavior of small
NFCs over the post-1970 period. Volatility has not been raised in the existing literature on financialization
and investment; however, these results suggest that rising volatility is an important factor in explaining
changes in firm investment behavior over the post-1970 period. Because volatility can, similarly, be expected
to influence the decisions to acquire financial assets and debt, it is an important factor to bring into the
discussion of the financialization of NFCs.
6 Conclusion
Changes in the portfolio composition and external financing behavior of NFCs over the post-1970 period in
the U.S. raise important questions about fixed investment and accumulation in a ‘financialized’ economy.
This paper contends that shareholder value norms and rising firm-level volatility are two factors driving
changes in portfolio composition and external financing behavior, and constraining NFC investment between
1971 and 2011. In doing so, this paper builds on a literature emphasizing the relationship between fixed
16Sub-period estimations, shown in the appendix, furthermore show that the negative relationship between shareholder value
norms and investment strengthens over the post-1970 period. Dropping the 1970s – the decade during which shareholder
value ideology had not yet become firmly entrenched – strengthens the estimated effect of shareholder value norms on fixed
investment. Additional robustness checks in the appendix further support the conclusion that shareholder value norms most
substantially and robustly impact the investment behavior of large NFCs.
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investment and financial profits, payments to the financial sector, and rentiers’ income. These indicators
of financialization are, however, endogenous to the individual firm’s investment decision and are ultimately
driven by other changes – for example, in managerial priorities or the institutional context within which
firms operate. This paper, therefore, explores the role of changing managerial priorities and rising firm-level
volatility in driving the sustained changes in NFC financial behavior over the post-1970 period that have led
to dramatic increases in indicators such as financial profits or rentiers’ income.
Shareholder value norms inhibit fixed investment by inducing a shift in managerial priorities towards
financial targets. A large literature critical of shareholder value ideology has raised concerns regarding the
implications shareholder value norms for a host of key economic variables, including employment, growth,
sustainable prosperity and investment. This paper corroborates the claims in this literature, emphasizing a
link between shareholder value norms and declining investment rates. It does so in a novel way, by examining
the implications of changing norms regarding corporate governance and the appropriate allocation of funds
for investment behavior. Rising firm-level volatility similarly makes managers less willing to tie-up funds in
long-term and irreversible investment projects.
Both the descriptive and econometric analysis in this paper emphasizes differences by firm size, pointing to
two different stories of financialization for large and for small firms. These firm-size differences indicate that
the constraints faced by small and large firms have evolved differently over the post-1970 period. Shareholder
value norms have significantly impacted the investment behavior of large firms. The dramatic increase in
volatility facing small firms, on the other hand, highlights that rising volatility is a particularly important
factor driving changes in the financial behavior of smaller NFCs. Concurrent de-leveraging and a declining
share of capital in small firm’s portfolios, furthermore, suggests that small firms have faced growing real-side
constraints that have led them to borrow less and hold more liquidity, inhibiting fixed investment.
The analysis in this paper lies entirely at the firm level. In many cases, particularly with the descriptive
statistics, large firms mirror the sector and drive the aggregate trends. Still, further analysis linking the firm
level to the aggregate level is necessary to draw conclusions about capital accumulation and macroeconomic
dynamics in the U.S. economy. The econometric results also raise some more specific questions; for example,
suggesting that large firms may exploit complementarities between financial and non-financial activities
that are not available to smaller firms, reflected in the positive relationship between the financial profit
rate and investment for large firms. This finding suggests that further investigations of financialization
and nonfinancial corporations should delve more specifically into the types of financial activities that NFCs
engage in. Because of the ambiguity regarding the definitions of ‘other’ financial assets in both the firm level
and the aggregate (Flow of Funds) data, this point also highlights the importance of case studies in further
research of financialization and nonfinancial firms. Overall, however, the findings in this paper suggest that
the increasingly financial orientation of firms in the U.S. economy inhibits fixed investment. In particular,
changes in the behavior of the largest firms, which are traditionally important sources of both employment
and investment in the U.S. economy, raise fundamental questions about the sustainability of increasingly
finance-oriented growth.
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Appendix:
Summary of variable definitions:
Variable Definition Compustat Items
I/K Investment rate Capital expenditures relative to the
capital stock (net property, plant and
equipment)
Capital expenditures (128)
Capital stock (141)
S/K Capacity utilization Sales relative to the capital stock Sales (12)
Capital stock (141)
⇡ Profit rate Gross operating income relative to the
capital stock
Operating income before
depreciation (13)
Capital stock (141)
idep Financial profit rate Gross non-operating income relative to
financial assets1
Non-operating income (61)
Financial assets (see below)
idebt Effective interest burden Interest payments relative to total
debt (the sum of current and
long-term debt)
Interest payments (15)
Total debt (34 and 142)
Mdep Financial assets Cash and short-term investments,
current receivables, other current
assets (less inventories), and ‘other’
investments and advances (which
includes, for example, investments in
and advances to unconsolidated
subsidiares and affiliates, and banks
and savings & loan investment
securities, and miscellaneous assets
such as stock or debt issuance costs)
(Relative to total assets in
econometric specification)
Financial assets (1, 2, 68, 31,
32, and 69 respectively)
Total assets (6)
D Total debt Current and long-term debt
(Relative to total assets in
econometric specification)
Total debt (34 and 142)
Total assets (6)
R Industry average of gross
repurchases
Gross repurchases relative to total
equity
Gross repurchases (115)
Total equity (144)
V Coefficient of variation in
sales to capital ratio2
The standard deviation of S/K
relative to the mean; five year average
Sales (12)
Capital stock (141)
1 The results are robust to financial profits defined as the sum of interest and dividend income.
2 The results are robust to defining the coefficient of variation in profits to capital ratio.
Inflation adjustment based off the GNP deflator.
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Additional specifications; dependent variable I/K
  Column 1 Column 2  Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 1971-2011 1981-2011 
(I/K)t-1 0.2561*** 0.2799*** 0.2762*** 0.1333*** 0.4381*** 0.2600*** 0.2600*** 
  (0.0102) (0.0118) (0.0102) (0.0186) (0.0204) (0.0118) (0.0130) 
(I/K)t=2 0.0324*** 0.0115 0.0266*** -0.0159 0.0142 0.0165* 0.0170* 
  (0.0062) (0.0077) (0.0067) (0.0118) (0.0128) (0.0083) (0.0089) 
(I/K)t-3 0.0099* -0.0012 0.0091 -0.0187* -0.0030 0.0032 0.0043 
  (0.0052) (0.0067) (0.0057) (0.0105) (0.0095) (0.0068) (0.0076) 
(S/K)t-1 0.0030*** 0.0038*** 0.0035*** 0.0035*** 00007 0.0035*** 0.0032*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
(S/K)t-2 -0.0006*** -0.0005** -0.0006*** -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0007*** -0.0005** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
(S/K)t-3 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0005*** -0.0004* 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
πt-1 -0.0008 -0.0011       -0.0007 -0.0012 
  (0.0014) (0.0015)     (0.0015) (0.0017) 
πt-2 -0.0016 -0.0001       0.0000 0.0007 
  (0.0014) (0.0015)     (0.0014) (0.0013) 
πt-3 0.0004 0.0013       0.0011 0.0013 
  (0.0009) (0.0012)     (0.0011) (0.0012) 
idept-1 -0.1447** -0.1487** -0.1684** 0.0024 0.0185 -0.1222* -0.1608** 
  (0.0631) (0.0715) (0.0705) (0.0829) (0.0381) (0.0670) (0.0669) 
idept-2 0.0562 0.0697 0.0999 0.0226 0.0401 0.0884 0.0599 
  (0.0580) (0.0635) (0.0665) (0.0858) (0.0345) (0.0591) (0.0609) 
idept-3 0.0087 -0.0048 0.0147 0.0084 -0.0190 -0.0157 0.0009 
  (0.0242) (0.0293) (0.0268) (0.0393) (0.0211) (0.0284) (0.0282) 
idebtt-1 -0.0121 -0.0455       -0.0468 -0.0813*** 
  (0.0302) (0.0329)     (0.0295) (0.0285) 
idebtt-2 0.0586* 0.0290       0.0301 0.0215 
  (0.0282) (0.0325)     (0.0319) (0.0318) 
idebtt-3 0.0083 0.0124       0.0099 0.0123 
  (0.0067) (0.0095)     (0.0094) (0.0098) 
(M/A)t-1 0.2368***   0.2023*** 0.2407*** 0.1748*** 0.1549*** 0.1425** 
  (0.0546)  (0.0578) (0.0695) (0.0521) (0.0552) (0.0580) 
(M/A)t-2 0.0902*   0.0233 0.0467 0.0756 0.1036* 0.0871 
  (0.0522)  (0.0616) (0.0730) (0.0467) (0.0560) (0.0597) 
(M/A)t-3 -0.1131***   -0.0120 0.0447 -0.1087*** -0.1002*** -0.1037*** 
  (0.0302)  (0.0373) (0.0466) (0.0345) (0.0360) (0.0383) 
(D/A)t-1 -0.1059*** -0.1078*** -0.1186*** -0.0888*** -0.0835** -0.1024*** -0.1101*** 
  (0.0284) (0.0328) (0.0313) (0.0295) (0.0402) (0.0314) (0.0336) 
(D/A)t-2 0.0892*** 0.0702** 0.0148 0.0106 -0.0422 0.0680** 0.0706** 
  (0.0309) (0.0344) (0.0339) (0.0317) (0.0412) (0.0334) (0.0349) 
(D/A)t-3 -0.0178 -0.0190 0.0149 0.0051 0.0360 -0.0234 -0.0173 
  (0.0159) (0.0249) (0.0229) (0.0241) (0.0301) (0.0236) (0.0242) 
Rt-1   -0.3038* -0.2103 -0.4433 -0.3805** -0.3366** -0.6048*** 
    (0.1554) (0.1542) (0.5467) (0.1594) (0.1551) (0.1597) 
Rt-2   -0.2974** -0.1778 -0.6922 -0.1328 -0.2130 -0.1643 
    (0.1448) (0.1427) (0.5032) (0.1423) (0.1469) (0.1525) 
Rt-3   -0.2631 0.1265 -0.5874 -0.4876*** -0.1862 -0.6536*** 
    (0.1821) (0.1759) (0.6741) (0.1858) (0.1792) (0.1830) 
Vt-1   -0.0939*** -0.0995*** -0.1003*** -0.0760*** -0.0990*** -0.0946*** 
    (0.0092) (0.0086) (0.0149) (0.0172) (0.0094) (0.0099) 
Obs 123,556 99,096 121,510 21,286 37,033 99,096 81,917 
Firms 13,319 10,316 11,833 3,683 3,125 10,316 9,394 
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan (p value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3352 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
2nd order auto. 0.3618 0.2219 0.3716 0.3530 0.0843 0.4691 0.5320 !
The estimation strategy is identical to that in table 3. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%.
Column 1: a baseline investment model that omits shareholder value norms and volatility.
Column 2: omits the stock of financial assets.
Columns 3-5: omits financing variables that are insignificant in full sample and show firm-size results (column 3 shows the full sample,
column 4 the smallest quartile of firms, and column 5 the largest quartile of firms). The results are robust to dropping insignificant
variables, and also reinforce that shareholder value norms primarily impacts large NFCs.
The last two columns show sub-period estimations: column 6 reproduces the full sample estimations, and column 7 drops 1971-1980.
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